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In 2007 a Free Trade Area (BFTA) will be created in the Balkans. In
this paper we study the potential impact of BFTA on trade growth in the SEE.
Given that welfare impacts associated with trade growth depend on the growth
channels, more goods and varieties exported or at higher price or higher volume
of goods and varieties are exported, in this paper we investigate the structure
of integration-induced export growth in the Balkans. The empirical implemen-
tation of our analysis is complicated by the fact that ￿rm-level trade data is
not available for the SEE economies. In order to cope with this data paucity,
we adopt a heterogeneous ￿rm framework, which allows us to decompose the
aggregate trade growth in two parts: the intensive margin of trade and the
extensive margin of trade using only aggregate trade data. The empirical ￿nd-
ings of our study suggest that the BFTA would primarily trigger trade growth
through a growing number of exported goods (the extensive margin of trade).
Thus, the actual welfare gains from trade growth in the Balkans might be larger
than predicted by previous trade studies. We also found that a variable trade
cost reduction would lead to higher export growth rates compared to a ￿xed
trade cost reduction. These results allow us to draw detailed policy conclusions.
Keywords: Balkans, export growth, regional integration, trade costs.
JEL classi￿cation: F12, F14, R12, R23.
1 Introduction
Since the early 1990s, the countries of South Eastern Europe (SEE)1 have been re-
forming their centrally planned economies to be more market oriented. In contrast
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1Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia &
Montenegro.
1to the Central and Eastern European (CEE) economies, the transition process in the
Balkan peninsula has been considerably delayed and complicated by internal upris-
ings and the outbreak of civil wars in the beginning of the nineties. The civil wars in
the Balkans began in 1991 and lasted for almost a decade.
The Balkan wars were characterised by armed con￿ icts between di⁄erent ethnic
groups of the former Yugoslavia (Stubos and Tsikripis 2007). According to Stubos
and Tsikripis, the armed con￿ icts in the Balkans had their roots not only in the
historical-cultural and religious tensions, but also in socio-economic problems. As a
result, in addition to the humanitarian tragedy, the civil wars in the Balkans brought
also a major deterioration in the SEE economic performance. The development of
the SEE foreign trade was determined by collapse of the Yugoslav internal market
and withering of the Socialist bloc external markets (Stubos and Tsikripis 2007). In
addition, the political independence movements of the former Yugoslav republics set
loose a wave of protectionism in the newly established states in the Balkans. All
these factors together led to a sharp decline in foreign trade openness during the
years of the Balkan wars, which resulted in rapidly declining foreign trade volumes.
For example, the share of external trade in the SEE￿ s GDP declined from 93% in
1990 to 54% in 1995 (Eurostat 2005).2
The Balkan wars ended in 1999 with much of the SEE economies reduced to
poverty and economic disruption.3 At the same time, the end of the civil wars cre-
ated favourable circumstances for a new attempt of building social, economic and
political stability in the Balkans. For example, the growing political stability, to-
gether with trade policy liberalisation measures, created favourable circumstances
for foreign trade and foreign direct investment in the Balkans. As a result, in the
post-war years the SEE external trade increased rapidly - 75% between 1994 and
2004 (Eurostat 2005).
Although, trade policy liberalisation was an important factor, which signi￿cantly
contributed to foreign trade growth in the post-war period, these extraordinary high
growth rates in Balkan foreign trade cannot solely be associated with the trade pol-
icy liberalisation measures. Other factors, such as the end of the civil wars in the
Balkans, an improvement in the implementation and application of laws, a decrease in
corruption, better management of basic public infrastructures and institutions, have
also contributed to better functioning of markets and, hence, to trade growth. In this
study we refer to all these factors together as trade freeness ￿ la Head and Mayer
(2004), which according to Figure 1 in section 4.3, have considerably increased since
the end of the civil wars in the Balkans.
Considering the SEE￿ s foreign trade policy, which signi￿cantly contributed to in-
2The external trade and foreign direct investment levels were also rather low relative to those of
CEE economies. Whereas the share of external trade in SEE￿ s GDP was 54% in 1995, the share in
CEE￿ s GDP was around 72% in 1995 (Eurostat 2005).
3Several armed con￿ icts have outbreak since the end of the civil wars in the Balkans, for example,
the Presevo Rebellion (2000-2001) and the Albanian Uprising in Macedonia (2001).
2creased trade freeness in the Balkans since the end of the civil wars, we can distinguish
two phases: (i) bilateral trade agreements (1999-2006); and (ii) a single free trade area
in the Balkans (2007-). In the context of the present study we can call the ￿rst phase
the bilateral phase and the second phase the FTA phase.
The ￿rst (bilateral) phase was commenced in 1999, right after end of the civil
wars in the Balkans, when eight SEE economies signed the Stability Pact for South
Eastern Europe. The SEE Stability Pact was an expression of strengthening e⁄orts to
foster peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity. Among
other things, the Pact provides a framework for stimulating regional co-operation and
economic integration. The SEE Stability Pact became operational in June 2001,4
when the SEE countries agreed to implement bilateral Free Trade Agreements in
order to develop their mutual trade and promote economic integration in the region.
During the bilateral phase of trade policy liberalisation in the Balkans, the eight SEE
economies have concluded a series of additional bilateral Free Trade Agreements with
a goal of expanding regional trade and thereby promoting growth, investment and
employment in the Balkan region. As a result, at the end of the bilateral phase there
was a network of 31 bilateral Free Trade Agreements.
Based on these ￿ndings and the Eurostat ( 2005) data we can summarise the bilat-
eral phase as follows: (i) since the end of the civil wars in the Balkans, trade freeness
has increased considerably; (ii) foreign trade policy mainly consisted of bilateral free
trade agreements; (iii) increased trade freeness induced sizeable trade growth in the
Balkans; (iv) both types of trade ￿ ows are observed in the SEE trade data: positive
for some products and some country pairs and zero trade ￿ ows for other products
and other country pairs; (v) the empirical trade data for the SEE provide a strong
evidence of intra-industry trade.
Preparations for the second (FTA) phase started in June 2005, when the SEE
economies have agreed to work towards transforming the current network of bilateral
Free Trade Agreements into a single regional free trade agreement. In July 2006 the
SEE countries decided that the Balkan Free Trade Agreement will be fully imple-
mented in 2007. The BFTA should simultaneously enlarge and amend the Central
European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) to include all SEE economies and update
it by including e⁄ective trade provisions.
Overall, the FTA phase is much less researched and its impacts are still largely
unknown. With respect to the proposed BFTA, many questions arise. Will the
SEE foreign trade continue to grow after the BFTA? What will be the impact of
BFTA on trade growth rates? How exactly the trade growth will occur - will trade
liberalisation increase the export volume and value of existing ￿rms or give incentives
for more ￿rms to enter foreign markets and start exporting? Given that empirical
knowledge about BFTA impact on trade in the Balkans is in an early stage, in this
study we are interested in this second - FTA phase. The main goal of this paper is
4Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia & Montenegro.
Moldova joined the SEE liberalisation process in 2002.
3to analyse the BFTA-induced export growth in the SEE.
The paper is structured as follows. After providing an overview of historical
development patterns and institutional settings in the SEE countries, we outline the
evolution of foreign trade among SEE economies in the Balkans. Next, we review the
most recent ￿ndings of international trade literature, where an increasing number of
empirical studies are interested not only in the volume but also in the structure of
trade growth. In section 3 we introduce the theoretical framework, which will be used
in the empirical analysis. Our analysis is based on a monopolistic competition trade
model, which allows to analyse the structure of trade growth based only on aggregate
trade data. The second step in our analysis involves parameter estimation. This is
done by deriving empirically estimable equations of trade ￿ ows and trade costs from
the theoretical trade model and estimating the two equations. The resulting estimates
provide numerical values of structural parameters for the underlying theoretical trade
model. Finally, in section 5 we use the estimated parameters and statistical data to
empirically implement the theoretical model and to make detailed predictions about
the structure of export growth induced by the BFTA. Based on these results in section
6 we draw policy conclusions and sketch avenues for future research.
2 Empirical evidence
In this section we review previous empirical and theoretical trade literature, which
o⁄ers useful insights for empirical analysis of trade growth. This allows us to establish
several important ￿ndings about international trade ￿ ows. First, according to recent
empirical research on the structure of commodities trade, aggregate trade ￿ ows are
composed of several components and, with detailed enough data, changes in each
of these components can be separately traced. Second, ￿rm-level trade studies have
identi￿ed several notable features of exporters that are overlooked in international
macroeconomic literature, but might be relevant for the present study. These ￿ndings
are relevant for selecting an appropriate theoretical framework for the present study.
2.1 De￿ning trade ￿ ows and trade growth
The trade literature uses a sizeable number of trade-speci￿c terms, such as trade
value, trade volume, trade ￿ ows, trade growth, intensive and extensive margins of
trade. Sometimes, di⁄erent terms are used to describe the same economic variables
or growth processes, and vice-versa. In order to facilitate the understanding of our
analysis and comparison with other studies, we start the literature review by de￿ning
key terms, which we consistently use throughout the paper. Given that in this study
we focus on export ￿ ows and export growth, we de￿ne key terms used in export
literature. The structure of import ￿ ows can be de￿ned and analysed analogously.
Usually in empirical trade literature (e.g. Anderson and Wincoop 2003) the total
value of exports, Eod, from exporting country o to importing country d is de￿ned as
4the number of shipments, Nod, times the average value per shipment, eod:
Eod = eod ￿ Nod (1)
Hummels and Klenow (2005) show that the decomposition of aggregate trade
growth can be performed along the same lines, i.e., trade growth can be decomposed
into two components. First, the incumbent ￿rms adjust their volume of exports,
i.e. the intensive margin measures trade growth within product lines. According to
Hummels and Klenow (2005) terminology, the intensive margin, eod, captures the
trade growth within product lines.5 Second, the number of traded varieties (traded
goods) change (increase). Analogously, Hummels and Klenow label the trade growth
that can be attributed to a larger number of traded varieties, Nod, as the extensive
margin of trade.
In the context of empirical studies, which we review in the following section, we
also need to de￿ne the ratios of ￿rms. The exporter ratio is de￿ned as the ratio of
exporters over the number of all ￿rms. The starter ratio is de￿ned as the ratio of new
￿rms, which enter foreign markets and start export to export, over the number of all
exporting ￿rms. Analogously, the stopper ratio is de￿ned as the ratio of exporters
that switch to non-exporter status to the number of last period exporters. Given
that the starter and stopper ratios can be considered as the transition probabilities
in export status, a higher starter ratio than stopper ratio does not necessarily mean
that the exporter ratio is increasing all the time. Unless explicitly mentioned, all
ratios are measured per year.
2.2 Empirical evidence: the dual margin
Early trade literature looked mainly at aggregate trade ￿ ows and trade growth. In
more recent years the identi￿cation of the two components of aggregate trade ￿ ows
(extensive and intensive margins) have attracted a considerable amount of research
attention. Di⁄erent strands of the international trade literature using di⁄erent theo-
retical frameworks have all contributed. Identi￿cation of the intensive trade margin
has most frequently been studied in plant-level trade studies. The extensive margin of
trade has attracted a considerable amount of research attention in studies analysing
di⁄erences between exporting ￿rms (exporters) and local sellers (non-exporters). In
this section we review main ￿ndings of the most recent international trade literature
with a view of ￿nding an appropriate analytical framework for the present study.
Several recent empirical trade studies using ￿rm-level trade data report that the
sets of exporters, goods and sectors change over time and vary more than has tradi-
tionally been assumed. For example, using annual data of Colombian manufacturing
5The intensive margin can further be decomposed into quantity changes or changes in the number
of units traded, xod, and price changes or changes in the average price of the traded units, pod. In
such case the trade growth can be decomposed into three components (Eod = xod ￿ pod ￿ Nod).
However, in the context of our study, only equation (1) is relevant.
5Census 1981 - 1989 Roberts and Tybout (1997) ￿nd that on average, the starter and
stopper ratios are about 3.3% and 11.5%, respectively with the average exporter ratio
of 11.8%. Similarly, Bernard and Wagner (1998) use annual manufacturing plant-
level data 1978 - 1992 in Lower Saxony, Germany and ￿nd that, on average, ratios of
￿rms entering and exiting exporting were about 4.14% and 5.51%, respectively with
the average exporter ratio of 41.2%.
Subsequent research by Bernard and Jensen (1999) suggests that exporters di⁄er
in the variety of goods that they trade and also in the range of countries they trade
with. Using detailed data from individual plants for the entire US manufacturing
sector Bernard and Jensen decompose sources of the US export boom in the late
1980s and early 1990s. They ￿nd that the preponderance of the increase in exports
came from increasing export intensity at ￿rms that were already exporting, but a
non-negligible share came from ￿rms that switched between only selling locally to
selling both locally and abroad. This ￿nding again indicates that a sizable share of
new trade is in the form of new goods not previously traded.
Using the U.S. Census Bureau￿ s Annual Survey of Manufacturers (ASM) 1986 -
1992 Bernard et al (2003) show that the ratio of non-exporters that transition to
exporter status to the number of last period non-exporters, which they term the
starter ratio, is about 14.4% per year. The ratio of exporters that switch to non-
exporter status to the number of last period exporters, the stopper ratio, is about
12.2% on average per year. The dynamics of export status result in changes in the
ratio of exporters among all ￿rms over time. The starter ratio is slightly higher than
stopper ratio and the average exporter ratio is about 51.8%. These results again
indicate the prevalence of the extensive margin of trade.
Kehoe and Ruhl (2002) have obtained similar results in a somewhat di⁄erent
setting. Kehoe and Ruhl provide one of the most detailed analysis of the changing
extensive margin in the wake of bilateral trade integration by studying trade inte-
grations in 18 countries and show how substantial increases in the extensive margin
coincide with trade integration. They investigate the importance of the extensive
and intensive margins in six major trade integration periods: the accession of Greece,
Spain and Portugal to the European Community, the Canada - USA Free Trade
Agreement (CUSTA), the implementation of the Single Market Programme and the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Using detailed data on interna-
tional trade ￿ ows by commodity, they ￿nd signi￿cant evidence of trade adjustments
through the extensive margin. Kehoe and Ruhl (2002) also ￿nd that the initially
￿ least traded￿product categories experienced the largest increases in export shares
following trade integration, which is a strong evidence of the extensive margin of
trade.
Hillberry and McDaniel (2002), using an alternative measure, ￿nd evidence of a
smaller, but still signi￿cant extensive margin growth for the United States following
the implementation of the NAFTA. They estimate that Mexican exports to the US
grew by $86 billion between 1993 and 2001, of which 12.5% is attributable to a larger
6extensive margin of trade. Correspondingly, Mexican imports from the US grew
by $44 billion, of which 9.7 percent occurred at the extensive margin. Their lower
estimates in comparison to Kehoe and Ruhl (2002) can likely be attributed to their
di⁄erent metric: Hillberry and McDaniel (2002) de￿ne a product category as traded
even if actual exports, though positive, are virtually insigni￿cant. In addition, they
focus on the e⁄ects of NAFTA per se and not on trade integration undertaken by
Mexico in earlier years.
Ruhl (2003) shows how permanent tari⁄ reductions, as opposed to temporary
business cycle shocks, a⁄ect ￿rms￿decisions to export. He ￿nds that tari⁄reductions
increase the extensive margin as new ￿rms enter export markets. In a calibrated
model Ruhl shows how the failure to account for these new goods produces upward
biased aggregate elasticities of exports with respect to tari⁄s.
The empirical results for Europe are similar, although, scarcer. Eaton et al (2004)
adopt the Melitz￿ s (2003) model to study French exports using ￿rm level-trade data.
They decompose French aggregate export ￿ ows based on data for individual ship-
ments. While Eaton et al take the size of importers as given, they analyse how
aggregate trade varies for a change in the importer￿ s size and a change in trade costs.
They ￿nd that a model with heterogeneous ￿rms that gives rise to variable extensive
and intensive margins is a reasonably accurate description of actual French trade pat-
terns. The authors show that variations in aggregate French exports are mostly due
to a change in the number of ￿rms, which export to foreign markets. However, the
dominance of the extensive margin is most visible, when the variation of aggregate
trade ￿ ows is due to a change in trade costs, for given market sizes of destination
countries. Eaton et al also analyse the decomposition of trade growth at the industry
level and ￿nd that aggregate features emphasising the prevalence of the extensive
margin do not di⁄er signi￿cantly across sectors.
Hillberry and Hummels (2005) is one of the few studies which analyse the structure
of intra-national trade ￿ ows. They investigate how U.S. domestic trade ￿ ows vary
with distance, using the 1997 Commodity Flow Survey. Hillberry and Hummels show
that distance reduces aggregate domestic ￿ ows mostly through a reduction in the
number of trade ￿ ows: at the sample mean distance, the extensive margin represents
62% of the elasticity of aggregate trade ￿ ows with respect to distance.
Hummels and Klenow (2005) study the response of the intensive and extensive
margins on country-level trade, relying on a de￿nition of the margins based on the
variation of exporting countries￿sizes. They analyse exports in 1995 from 110 coun-
tries to 59 importers and decompose the greater trade of larger economies into contri-
butions from the intensive and extensive margins of trade. In addition, they compare
prices and quantities of exports by di⁄erent countries to given market-categories and
estimate quality di⁄erences across exporters. The main ￿nding of Hummels and
Klenow is that the extensive margin accounts for two-thirds of greater exports of
larger economies, and one-third of greater imports of smaller economies. For both
imports and exports, larger economies trade in more categories and trade with more
7partners. Richer countries export more units at higher prices, therefore producing a
higher quality, and exporting mainly at the ￿ quality￿(extensive) margin.
2.3 Empirical evidence: the heterogeneity of ￿rms
The second key ￿nding about the international trade ￿ ows which results from previous
￿rm-level studies concerns heterogeneity of exporting ￿rms. The main ￿nding of these
studies is that only few ￿rms export, and among exporters, only few ￿rms export to
more than a few countries. Most exporters only sell a small fraction of their output
abroad. These results are in sharp contrast to gravity models with homogenous ￿rms,
where every ￿rm sells in every region/country.
Another ￿nding of the ￿rm-level studies is that exporters are di⁄erent from non
exporters, moreover, they are di⁄erent in many respects. Usually, they are much
larger and are more productive as well as more capital intensive than ￿rms selling
all output locally. Several studies have also found that having exported in the past
signi￿cantly increases the probability of a ￿rm exporting today. Bernard and Jensen
(1999), for example, found that a ￿rm exporting today is 36% more likely to export in
the future than a ￿rm not exporting today. This result imply that exporting and non-
exporting ￿rms are much more heterogeneous than used to assume in representative
￿rm models.
The third ￿nding, which is relevant for our study, is the evidence of export entry
costs. Several ￿rm-level studies found a signi￿cant evidence for the presence of sunk
costs associated with exporting. Bernard and Jensen (1999) and Bernard et al (2003)
all report substantial evidence of ￿xed entry costs into foreign markets. By accounting
for ￿xed trade costs Evenett and Venables (2002) could explain the many zeros (non-
traded varieties) in bilateral trade data. Evenett and Venables also document that the
number of non-traded varieties has substantially dropped over time. This suggests
that a reduction in ￿xed costs or growth of income can play an important role in
accounting for the growth of world trade. Evenett and Venables (2002) ￿nd that the
removal of zeros accounts for one third of developing countries￿export growth since
1970. These empirical ￿ndings highlight the relevance of ￿xed costs associated with
exporting.
Findings of previous trade studies discussed in sections 2.2 and 2.3 can be sum-
marised as follows: (i) aggregate trade growth usually occurs through two channels:
previously non-traded goods become traded and new ￿rms start exporting; and exist-
ing exporters increase their export volume of goods and varieties already exported; (ii)
those producers that export their goods abroad signi￿cantly di⁄er from non-exporters
(higher productivity, higher levels of output, and more capital intensive); and (iii)
entering export markets is associated with entry costs, which are sunk after entry
decision.
83 Theoretical framework
There are several methodological approaches for decomposing aggregate trade ￿ ows.
The most straightforward is to use ￿rm-level data for prices, quantities and the num-
ber of shipments. Unfortunately, such data is not available for the SEE post-war
economies in the Balkans. Thus, this approach is not suitable for the SEE. Data
limitations in the SEE require an analytical approach which would allow us to infer
di⁄erential changes in the extensive and intensive margins in the pattern of trade
growth using only aggregate trade volume data. In fact, given that we are interested
in decomposing the SEE bilateral trade ￿ ows in to only two components (extensive
and intensive margins), we need to identify either one. The other trade margin could
then be calculated as a residual from aggregate trade ￿ ows, which are available in
the SEE trade data.
Identi￿cation of the intensive trade margin is rather involved, as we would need
data for both prices and quantities of exported goods. Identi￿cation of the extensive
trade margin requires information about the number of traded varieties, which for
most manufactured goods is equal to the number of exporting ￿rms. If all ￿rms in
country o would export to country d, we could use the Krugman￿ s (1980) monopolistic
competition trade model. However, according to empirical trade data for SEE, both
types of trade ￿ ows are observed in the Balkans: positive trade ￿ ows for some products
and some country pairs and zero trade ￿ ows for other products and other country
pairs (Eurostat 2005). Thus, the Krugman￿ s (1980) model is not suitable for SEE. A
data-undemanding analysis of trade structure in the Balkans requires an approach,
where exporting ￿rms is a subset of the total number of ￿rms in country o, which is
both sector and destination-speci￿c.
Melitz (2003) extended the Krugman￿ s (1980) model by assuming that ￿rms in
country o are heterogenous according to their productivity and only the most pro-
ductive ones export to country d. Separation of exporting ￿rms from non-exporters
￿ la Melitz￿ s (2003) requires statistical data for ￿rm distribution and information
about the threshold productivity above which ￿rms export to d. The ￿rm produc-
tivity distribution is set arbitrarily, usually it is assumed to be Pareto (Melitz 2003).
The threshold productivity (exporting threshold) can be determined from the export
entry cost.
The Melitz￿ s (2003) model would allow us to identify the number of exporting
￿rms from country o to country d (extensive margin), from the aggregate trade data.
The downside of the Melitz (2003) approach is that it requires more parameters and
several additional assumptions about ￿rm heterogeneity, ￿rm distribution and export
entry costs. The ￿rst assumption of productivity heterogeneity of ￿rms ￿nds indeed
strong evidence in ￿rm-level data, which we discussed in the previous two sections.
In particular, ￿rm-level empirical evidence suggests that those producers that export
their goods abroad di⁄er from non-exporters along several dimensions: exporters
tend to have higher productivity, higher levels of output, and use more capital and
9labour inputs. The second assumption about distribution of ￿rm heterogeneity is little
researched and, therefore, is subject to sensitivity analysis. The third assumption
of export entry cost ￿nds strong support in the empirical trade data. All studies
discussed in the previous two sections ￿nd strong evidence of ￿xed market entry
costs associated with exporting abroad.
In this section we introduce the theoretical framework of our study, which is largely
based on the Melitz￿ s (2003) model,6 which in turn is an extension of the Krugman￿ s
(1980) model of trade with monopolistic competition and increasing returns. We
start by introducing the basic ingredients of Melitz￿ s model: de￿ning preferences and
technologies and characterising the optimal strategies of both ￿rms and consumers in
partial equilibrium. Next, by determining the selection of ￿rms into local producers
and exporters, we are able to compute the global general equilibrium. As in Melitz
(2003), the selection among exporters and non-exporters is based on the assumptions
that ￿rms are heterogeneous and exporters face ￿xed costs associated with entering
foreign markets, implying that less productive ￿rms are not able to generate enough
revenue abroad to cover the ￿xed costs of entering foreign markets. Thus, according
to the Melitz￿ s (2003) model, exporters are only a subset of domestic ￿rms and this
subset of exporters varies with characteristics of foreign markets. This type of sorting
mechanism is indeed in line with empirical ￿ndings, which we have established in the
previous section, i.e. exporters are more pro￿table than non-exporters. We may
conclude that the Melitz￿ s (2003) model can be applied for studying trade growth in
the SEE transition economies under reasonable assumptions.
As in the Melitz￿ s (2003) model there are R countries that produce goods using
only labour. Country r has a total labour force Lr. All countries have access to the
same technologies. There are two types of sectors: one traditional sector, A, and
one manufacturing industry, X. Given the trade focus of our analysis we assume
that all manufacturing goods can be traded among all countries. The ￿ traditional￿
sector produces a homogenous ￿ traditional￿good under perfect competition, constant
returns to scale with unit labour requirement. As usual, the ￿ traditional￿sector is
immobile, and the ￿ traditional￿good is assumed to be traded freely at zero trade cost.
It serves as a numeraire in our model, therefore, its price is normalised to 1. Given
that every country produces the homogenous good and the homogenous good is set
as a numeraire, wages are equalised to unity in every country.
The manufacturing industry supplies a continuum of di⁄erentiated goods and, as
usual in monopolistic competition models, each ￿rm is a monopolist for the variety
it produces. Manufacturing goods face positive trade costs. As in Melitz (2003), we
assume two types of trade costs: variable trade cost and ￿xed trade cost. In contrast
to Melitz￿ s model, which assumes that a ￿rm has ￿rst to pay a ￿xed cost to survive at
home and then it has to pay a ￿xed cost for entering export markets, we assume that
all ￿rms have to pay only one ￿xed cost for entering any market. This adjustment,
which considerably reduces the ￿xed cost data requirements, is required to make
6The present model also incorporates features of Chaney (2007) and Helpman et al (2007).
10the empirical implementation of the model feasible in the SEE transition economies,
where no comparable ￿xed cost data is available. Although, the two di⁄erent entry
costs in the Melitz￿ s (2003) model might more precisely describe ￿rms dynamics, they
o⁄er little additional insights in the behaviour of exporters, which is the main focus
of the present study.
3.1 Preferences and technology
We start the formal description of the model with consumer preferences. We assume
that the produced goods are consumed by workers, which are the only consumers. All
consumers have identical CES preferences over traditional and manufacturing goods.
A consumer that consumes CA units of the homogenous good, xj units of each variety
j of the manufacturing good, and N varieties of the di⁄erentiated manufacturing good












where ￿x is the elasticity of substitution between manufacturing varieties and ￿
is consumer demand parameter determining expenditure shares, with ￿x > 1 and
￿A + ￿x = 1.
There are two types of trade costs for shipping manufacturing goods from origin
country o and selling in destination country d: variable trade cost, ￿od and ￿xed
trade cost, FCod. The variable trade cost are of ￿ iceberg￿form: if one unit of the
di⁄erentiated manufacturing good is shipped from origin country o to destination
country d, only fraction 1
￿od arrives at d. Following Samuelson (1954), we assume
that the rest melts on the way. The higher is ￿, the higher is the variable trade
cost. The second type of trade cost manufacturing ￿rms face are export entry costs,
which do not depend on the quantity sold abroad. If a ￿rm in country o exports
to country d, it must pay a ￿xed cost FCod. These costs include foreign marketing
and distribution costs, bureaucratic procedures on the border, and required changes in
product characteristics to match up to the tastes of foreign consumers and government
regulations. The presence of ￿xed cost in the di⁄erentiated manufacturing sector
gives rise to increasing returns to scale production technology. By abstracting from
additional domestic production entry costs allows us to focus on export entry and
exit decisions of ￿rms.
Assuming that each manufacturing ￿rm draws a random unit labour productivity
’, a ￿rm from country o with productivity ’ has the following cost of producing x
units of manufacturing good x and selling it in country d: c(x) = x
’ + FCod.
As usual in the monopolistic competition framework, ￿rms are price setters. Given
that demand functions are iso-elastic, the optimal price charged in country d by ￿rm j








where pod is price of the manufacturing variety produced in region o and sold in
region d. The restriction ￿ > 1 ensures that the output price, po, is always positive.
Furthermore, we assume that the total mass of ￿rms is proportional to country￿ s
endowment with labour force, Lr.7 As in Melitz (2003), we assume that ￿rms draw
the productivity from a Pareto distribution with scaling parameter ￿ and that ￿rm
productivity is distributed according to P (~ ’ < ’) = F (’) = 1￿’￿￿, with dF (’) =
￿￿￿’d’ for ’ ￿ 1. Variable ￿ is an inverse measure of ￿rm heterogeneity in the
manufacturing sector, with ￿ > 2 and ￿ > ￿ ￿ 1.8 Sectors with lower ￿ are more
heterogeneous, in the sense that more output is concentrated among the largest and
most productive ￿rms.
3.2 Equilibrium
As in Melitz (2003), we assume that each ￿rm in every country chooses a strategy,
taking strategies of all other ￿rms and all consumers as given. A strategy for a ￿rm
is both a subset of countries, where to sell its output and prices to set for its goods
in each market. A strategy for a consumer is the quantity to consume of each variety
of every good available domestically, given its price. From the optimal strategies
of ￿rms and consumers in every country, we can subsequently compute the global
general equilibrium. The global trade equilibrium is characterised by a set of prices
and quantities that correspond to a ￿xed point of the best response graph of each
agent.
Given the optimal pricing strategy of ￿rms and the optimal demand strategy
of consumers, we can derive ￿rm exports, eod, from origin country o to destination
country d:






where ’ is ￿rm-speci￿c productivity and Pd is price index of horizontally di⁄er-
entiated manufacturing goods in destination country d. If only those ￿rms above the
7Implicitly, we assume that there is a group of ￿rms proportional to the size of the country. We
could remove this assumption, and allow for the free entry of ￿rms, with an in￿nite set of potential
￿rms. According to Chaney (2007), we would obtain qualitatively the same results, if trade barriers
are not negligible.
8ln’ has a standard deviation equal to 1
￿. The assumption ￿ > ￿￿1 ensures that, in equilibrium,
the size distribution of ￿rms has a ￿nite mean. If this assumption were violated, ￿rms with an
arbitrarily high productivity would represent an arbitrarily large fraction of all ￿rms, and they would
overshadow less productive ￿rms. Results on selection into export markets would be degenerate.
This assumption is satis￿ed in the data for all countries in our sample.
12productivity threshold ￿ ’rd from country o would export to country d, then the ideal


















As long as net pro￿ts generated by exports to country d are su¢ cient to cover
￿xed entry cost, FCod, ￿rms will be willing to export to country d. The pro￿ts earned





where rod (’) is ￿rm revenue from selling in country d. As in Melitz (2003), the
productivity threshold, ￿ ’od, corresponds to productivity of the least productive ￿rm
in country o, for which gross pro￿ts earned in country d are just enough to cover the
￿xed costs of entering market d:
￿od (￿ ’od) = FCod (7)










with ￿1 a constant.9 We assume that trade barriers are always high enough to
ensure that 8 j, r, ￿ ’od > 1.10
Consumer prices in destination country d depend on country characteristics. More
precisely, they are increasing in trade costs decreasing in market size. From equation
(8) we can calculate the set of ￿rms that export to country d. Because of the selection
that takes place among exporters, this set (￿rms exporting to country d) only depends
on country d￿ s characteristics and trade costs.
















Plugging the productivity threshold from equation (8) into price index (9), we can





















10This assumption is well supported by the empirical research using ￿rm-level data, e.g. from the
U.S. Census Bureau￿ s Annual Survey of Manufacturers.












rd , with L ￿
PR
r=1 Lr. Vari-
able ￿d is an aggregate index of d￿ s remoteness from the rest of the world.12 It is
similar to the ￿ multilateral resistance variable￿introduced by Anderson and Wincoop
(2003). In addition to their measure, it takes into account the impact of ￿xed costs
and the impact of ￿rm heterogeneity on prices.
Firm heterogeneity has a direct impact on the average productivity of exporters
in the destination market, d. Larger and more integrated markets attract more ￿rms,
and the new ￿rms that enter foreign markets are typically less productive. These new
entrants lower the average productivity of suppliers. Equations (7) and (10) allow us
to derive the average productivity of ￿rms exporting to country d as a function of
export entry cost into, FCod, country d￿ s remoteness from its trading partners, ￿d,
country d￿ s market size, Ld, and the bilateral unit trade cost, ￿rd:













where ￿~ ’ is constant.13 According to equation (11), countries that are expensive
for exporting ￿rms to enter (FCod large), far away (￿od large), or which have a small
market (Ld low), attract only the most productive exporters. If country d is far
away from its trading partners (￿d large), it is harder for exporting ￿rms to compete,
implying that only the most productive ￿rms from country o are able to enter country
d. According to equation (11) variable trade cost, ￿od, with elasticity one is the major
determinant of the average productivity of exporters in the destination market, d.
3.3 Trade
In the previous section we have solved for price indices of tradable goods in every
country. In this section we use the general equilibrium price index to solve for ￿rm
level exports and the exporting productivity threshold. The expression for ￿rm level
exports, which we obtain in this section di⁄ers from neoclassical models of trade in
homogeneous goods. Moreover, because of the two simplifying assumptions which we
have made at the beginning, they also di⁄er from Melitz (2003) implying that the
results we obtain in this section are not directly comparable to the Melitz￿ s model.
While in Melitz￿ s model ￿rm level exports depend on both domestic and exporting
productivities, in our model, which is similar to Chaney 2007, ￿rm level exports
















12A simple way to interpret this aggregate index is to look at a symmetrical case: when ￿rd = ￿d













14form solutions of intensive and extensive margins, which are important for empirical
analysis of the present study.
By plugging the general equilibrium price index from equation (10) into the de-
mand function and into the productivity threshold (8), we obtain general equilibrium
exports, eod (’), from origin country o to destination country d:











the productivity threshold ￿ ’od above which ￿rms from o export to d, is given by













where ￿3 and ￿4 are constants.14 According to equation (12), ￿rm exports are
determined by the countries￿relative size, Ld, bilateral trade barriers, FCod and ￿od,
and the d￿ s remoteness from the rest of the world, ￿d. Individual ￿rm exports depend
on the transportation cost, ￿od, with elasticity 1￿￿ and on the size of the destination
market, Ld, with elasticity ￿￿1
￿ , which is less than one, because of the impact of market
size and because of the impact of price competition. Both these elasticities are smaller
than the corresponding elasticities of aggregate trade, because aggregate trade volume
depends also on the number of exporters, Nod, which is de￿ned as follows:













where ￿E is a constant.15 According to equation (14), the number of ￿rms, Nod,
reacts to changes in unit trade costs, ￿od, with an elasticity of ￿, and to changes in
the size of origin and destination countries, Lr, with elasticity 1, which is close to the
values recovered from the ￿rm-level trade data (see section 4).
According to the de￿nition of Eod, which is given in equation (1), aggregate exports
(f.o.b.) from origin country o to destination country d can be decomposed as the
number of exporters times the average exports per ￿rm with an average productivity
above ~ ’od:







where Nod is the number of exporting ￿rms (the extensive margin of trade) and eod
is the average value per shipment (the intensive margin of trade). Adopting Hummels






















15exporting ￿rms, which in our model is equal to the number of goods/varieties traded.
The intensive margin is accordingly de￿ned by the size of exporters, which in our
model is equal to the size of ￿rm exports.
Substituting equations (12) and (14) into equation (15), total exports, Eod, in
































According to equation (16), the aggregate exports from origin country o to desti-
nation country d depend on the relative size of countries, Lr
L , on destination country
d￿ s multilateral resistance, ￿d, and on bilateral transport costs (both ￿xed and vari-
able) among the trading partners. As in equation (15), aggregate exports, Eod, may
vary due to changes in average value, eod, per shipment (intensive margin of trade)
or due to changes in the number of shipments, Nod, (extensive margin of trade) both
of which in turn may vary across destinations and co-vary with trade costs.
3.4 Discussion of the model
The right hand side explanatory variables in equation (16) are similar to the tradi-
tional explanatory variables of conventional gravity models of trade with representa-
tive ￿rms. Despite the underlying common gravity structure, the trade model derived
in equation (16) di⁄ers from gravity models with representative ￿rms in several re-
spects. In this section we identify these features. In light of these di⁄erences we then
discuss those assumptions, which have led to these di⁄erences.
First, given that in our model ￿rms have to pay export entry cost, trade costs may
reduce quantities exported to the point that ￿rms can no longer cover ￿xed costs of
exporting. Thus, our model allows for ￿rms from country o to choose not to export
to country d, because, it is possible that no ￿rm in country o has productivity above
the threshold, ￿ ’od, that makes exports to d pro￿table, if trade barriers are su¢ ciently
high. The model is therefore able to predict zero exports from o to d for some country
pairs and some products. As a result, our model is consistent with zero trade ￿ ows
in both directions between some Balkan countries, as well as zero exports from o to
d but positive exports from o to r for some other country pairs. Both types of trade
patterns exist in the SEE trade data.
Second, our model can predict positive trade ￿ ows in both directions for some
country pairs. The two-way trade ￿ ows are important if we wish our model to be
consistent with the two-way trade observed in trade data for the SEE economies.
According to the Eurostat (2005) data, positive two-way trade ￿ ows are observed for
all SEE countries in our sample. Although, one-way international trade ￿ ows prevail
in the Balkans underlying the inter-sectoral trade pattern and the complementarity of
16factor endowments, the share of two-way trade signi￿cant (and increasing). Consid-
ering the 1999-2004 period, similar dynamics are observed in di⁄erent SEE countries,
although with di⁄erent intensities, pointing to the reduction of one-way trade and
the increase of two-way trade, especially in vertically di⁄erentiated goods (Eurostat
2005).
Third, the elasticities with respect to trade costs are di⁄erent. In gravity models
with representative ￿rms the elasticity of exports with respect to trade costs are equal
to ￿ ￿ 1. In contrast, in our model the elasticity of exports with respect to variable
costs depends on the degree of ￿rm heterogeneity, ￿, but not on the elasticity of
substitution between manufacturing varieties, ￿. Given that ￿ > ￿ ￿1, in our model
the elasticity of exports with respect to variable trade barriers, ￿od, is larger than
in the absence of ￿rm heterogeneity. The elasticity of exports with respect to ￿xed
trade costs is negatively related to the elasticity of substitution ￿. This prediction
is in stark contrast to gravity models with representative ￿rms. Moreover, in our
model the elasticity of exports with respect to trade costs depends on the degree of
￿rm heterogeneity, ￿. In more homogeneous sectors (￿ high) large productive ￿rms
represent a smaller fraction of ￿rms. The productivity threshold moves in a region
where most of the mass of ￿rms lies. In those sectors, aggregate exports are sensitive
to changes in trade costs because many ￿rms exit and enter when variable trade costs
￿ uctuate.
Finally, in the context of trade growth in the SEE transition economies, we are
particularly interested in data requirements. The advantage of our approach is that,
despite the fact that the theoretical model assumes ￿rm-level heterogeneity, the un-
derlying theoretical model does not require ￿rm-level data to study the structure
of trade growth. This stems from the fact that exporter features can be identi￿ed
from variations in the characteristics of trading countries. Given that for every ori-
gin country o, its exports to di⁄erent destination countries vary by characteristics
of importing countries, there exist su¢ cient statistics, which can be computed from
aggregate data that can decompose the aggregate export volume between the SEE
Balkan economies. The downside of our approach is that introducing ￿rm heterogene-
ity and ￿xed trade costs requires more parameters for the empirical implementation
of the theoretical trade model. In particular, an additional parameter describing ￿rm
heterogeneity is required and a parameter capturing export entry cost is required. In
order to deal with increased parameter requirements, we estimate model parameters
econometrically, which is done in the next section.
4 Parameter estimation
In the previous section we have presented the underlying trade model, which forms the
theoretical basis for the empirical analysis. Before the theoretical trade model can be
empirically implemented, it needs to be parameterised. Two types of parameters are
required by the theoretical trade model: trade freeness and behavioural parameters.
17In order to obtain numerical values of model parameters, we estimate two equations:
a trade freeness equation and an alternative gravity equation of trade ￿ ows. The
estimated coe¢ cients of the former will provide trade cost estimates, while the latter
will provide estimates for behavioural parameters.
We proceed as follows. First, we derive an empirically estimable trade freeness
equation. Next, we estimate the freeness of trade for selected SEE economies. Second,
we use the theoretical trade model, which we have presented in the previous section,
to derive an empirically estimable gravity model of bilateral trade ￿ ows. The gravity
model of trade is estimated econometrically and the results are presented in section
4.4.
4.1 Trade cost speci￿cation
One of the key explanatory variables in the underlying theoretical trade model are
inter-regional trade costs. The theoretical trade model distinguishes between two
types of trade costs: variable trade cost, ￿od, and ￿xed trade cost, FCod. Given that
the true trade costs are unobservable in the SEE transition economies, we follow
Head and Mayer (2004), which proposed an alternative measure of trade costs. They
propose that trade costs can be proxied by the trade freeness. According to Head
and Mayer, the index of trade freeness, ￿od, captures the easiness with which two
countries participate in reciprocal trade and is de￿ned as ￿od = ￿
1￿￿
od .16 Given that
￿ > 1, trade freeness is inversely related to trade costs.
However, given that in the underlying theoretical trade model manufacturing ￿rms
face two di⁄erent trade costs, we cannot straightforwardly apply the Head and Mayer
(2004) de￿nition of trade freeness. Instead, we need to derive a measure of trade free-
ness, which would be consistent with the underlying theoretical framework. According







od . Thus, our measure is di⁄erent from the Head and Mayer trade
freeness measure in two respects. First, our measure, ￿od, accounts for both ￿xed and
variable trade costs. Second, the elasticities which relate the trade freeness to trade
costs are di⁄erent.
A structural estimation of the index of trade freeness, ￿od, is extremely data
demanding and cannot be performed even for the old EU member states, where the
statistical data base is considerably more developed than for transition economies
in Eastern Europe. In order to cope with data limitations, Head and Mayer (2004)
suggested that calculation of the trade freeness index, ￿od, can be facilitated by
making two simplifying assumptions: symmetric trade costs for external trade (￿od =
￿do) and zero trade costs for trade within countries (￿rr = 1).
Because of data limitations in the SEE transition economies, in this study we can
only calculate the ￿ reduced form￿of trade freeness, ￿od. In view of SEE, the ￿rst
16This trade cost measure, which Baldwin et al (2003) cunningly refer to as the ￿ phi-ness￿of trade,
is often employed in economic geography models as a proxy for trade costs.
18assumption is not critical for countries in our sample, because none of the included
Balkan economies has a signi￿cant geographical advantage or disadvantage, which
could asymmetrically a⁄ect bilateral trade ￿ ows. The second assumption might be-
come critical under certain circumstances. In particular, internal trade costs usually
increase with size of the country. Consequently, when trade costs arise only for cross-
border transactions, trade freeness might be underestimated, suggesting lower levels
of trade integration. Thus, from the economic geography￿ s perspective, the estimated
trade freeness might potentially be upward biased for geographically large countries,
such as Bulgaria and Romania.
According to Head and Mayer (2004), assuming frictionless intranational trade
and symmetric trade costs for bilateral trade, the index of country trade freeness,






where ￿od is the trade freeness index, Eod is value of goods and services exports
from origin country o to destination country d and Edo captures exports from d to
o. Denominator factors Eoo and Edd are exporting and importing countries domestic
sales. They are calculated as the value of all shipments of an industry minus the sum
of shipments to all other countries (exports).
Two-way parameter restrictions need to be imposed, when estimating equation
(17): the trade freeness estimates, ^ ￿od, need to be bounded both from above and
from below. These restrictions imply that the estimated trade freeness can only take
values between zero and one, 0 < ￿od < 1, with 0 denoting prohibitive trade costs
and 1 denoting free trade.17
4.2 Trade ￿ ow speci￿cation
In this section we specify an econometrically estimable gravity model of bilateral
trade ￿ ows. The departure point of the empirical speci￿cation is equation (16), which
suggests a trade model with exports, Eod, as the dependent variable and, the relative
market sizes, bilateral trade costs and country multilateral resistance as explanatory
variables. Plugging equation (13) into equation (16) and collecting terms we obtain













According to equation (18), aggregate exports from origin country o to destination
country d is determined by the relative size of countries, Lr
L , the destination country
17Theoretically, the trade freeness index could be larger than 1, if the external trade of both
trading partners is larger than internal trade. However, this is not an issue in the SEE trade.
19d￿ s multilateral resistance, ￿d, the variable trade costs, ￿od, and by the ￿xed trade
costs, FCod.
The empirical estimation of equation (18) faces several complications. In particu-
lar, we identify two issues: the potential endogeneity of the right-hand side explana-
tory variables and the omitted variables bias. In the following we discuss these two
estimation issues and propose solutions how do we deal with them.
We start with the potential endogeneity problems. According to the underlying
theoretical trade model, the endogeneity of explanatory variables might be caused in
at least two ways. First, export ￿ ows might potentially give rise to adjustments in the
explanatory variables, i.e. reverse causality. For example, labour demand in country
o is an increasing function of exports from country o. Second, in the SEE transition
economies there may exist confounding factors, such as macroeconomic shocks and
structural adjustments, which might contemporaneously a⁄ect both sectoral employ-
ment and export ￿ ows. For instance, a negative income shock through the Balkan
wars may induce emigration and, at the same time, reduce export demand within
SEE.
The potential endogeneity of explanatory variables implies that equation (18), will
likely yield biased and inconsistent estimates. We use two di⁄erent approaches to get
around the endogeneity problems. First, we consider relative export ￿ ows instead of
gross exports, i.e., we estimate the ratio of gross exports from country o to country
d with respect to to exports from country d to country o. This transformation al-
lows us to substitute out the sectoral labour demand, Lo, which is a major source
of endogeneity in equation (18).18 Second, we follow HonorØ and Kyriazidou (2000)
and use instrumental variables with lagged values of right-hand side explanatory vari-
ables as ￿ instruments￿ .19 Thus, we implicitly assume that exporting decision at date
t are determined from a comparison of potential pro￿ts and costs at date t ￿ 1. We
restrict the number of lags to one in order not to loose further time-series observa-
tions. For the instrumental variables estimation we need to assume that instruments
are predetermined, and export ￿ ows and confounding factors in residuals only af-
fect contemporaneous and future labour force supply in exporting and in importing
countries.








Edo are relative exports from country o to country d, 4FCod ￿
FCod
FCdo is the ratio of export entry costs and 4￿do ￿
￿d
￿o is the ratio of multilateral
resistance between origin country o and destination country d. Although, none of the
right hand side variables in (19) are directly observable in the data, they all can be
18Due to symmetric per-unit trade costs, ￿od, cancels out too.
19Although, properly taken, these are not instruments but lagged values of explanatory variables,
given that in the context of our analysis this does not cause a confusion, we call them instruments.
20The time notation will be introduced in the econometric model.
20calculated from statistical data which is available. The dependent variable, 4Eod,
can be straightforwardly calculated from the bilateral exports between o and d, and
d and o. The two explanatory variables are unobservable, but can be calculated on
the basis of observable variables. Given that the ratio of ￿xed trade costs, 4FCod, is
equal to the pro￿t ratio, 4￿od, it can be calculated from the ￿rm pro￿t data, which
is available in the SEE data.21 The other explanatory variable in equation (19) is
the ratio of multilateral resistance between origin region o and destination region d.






L ￿rd) using data for the
regional labour endowment and the trade freeness estimates.
Obviously, beyond the included explanatory variables, unobservable economic and
non-economic characteristics of regions, such as amenities, also play an important role
in exporting decisions of ￿rms. According to previous research (e.g. MÆtyÆs 1998,
Egger 2000), there are several reasons to assume that country-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects are
relevant when geographical, political or historical determinants that could drive or
hamper trade ￿ ows are present. These factors are deterministically linked to country-
speci￿c characteristics and cannot consequently be considered as random. Failing to
account for the unobserved cross-section heterogeneity would yield biased estimates.
Following these ￿ndings, we explicitly account for country pair-speci￿c e⁄ects,
which ￿as emphasised by Arellano and HonorØ (2001) ￿should reduce the hetero-
geneity bias. More precisely, in order to to avoid potential misspeci￿cation problems
due to omitted variables, we include a constant term of country-speci￿c character-
istics and use the ￿xed e⁄ects estimator. According to previous panel data studies
of trade ￿ ows, which estimate gravity model using panel data estimators, in order
to obtain an e¢ cient estimator, instead of using one dummy variable per country,
individual country pair dummies (￿xed e⁄ects) should preferentially be included in
the econometric model (Anderson and Wincoop 2003). Following these ￿ndings, we
include a time invariant constant term, ￿od, which captures ￿xed e⁄ects between ex-
porting country o and importing country d, among the right hand side explanatory
variables in equation (19).
Applying a logarithmic transformation to equation (19) and introducing the time
reference, we obtain the following linearly estimable gravity equation of export ￿ ows
from origin country o to destination country d:
log4Eodt = ￿1 + ￿2 log4FCodt￿1 + ￿3 log4￿dot￿1 + ￿od + ￿odt (20)
where ￿1 is intercept and ￿2 and ￿3 are the coe¢ cients to estimate, ￿od is a
time invariant constant term capturing country-pair speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects and ￿od is
a random prediction error. According to equation (20), exports from country o to
21Using equations (6), (10) and (11), we can express average pro￿ts of exporting from coun-











is the mark-up. The mark-up cancels out, when we take the ratios of ￿xed
costs and pro￿ts.
21country d are determined by ￿xed trade costs and the multilateral resistance in im-
porting country o and exporting country d. These e⁄ects are ampli￿ed by the degree
of ￿rm concentration (heterogeneity) and by the degree of product di⁄erentiation
(substitutability).
The inclusion of ￿xed e⁄ects does not allow estimation of time-invariant explana-
tory variables, which enter also into the ￿xed e⁄ects.22 This implies that we will not be
able to identify the time-invariant explanatory variables in equation (20). Analysing
the right hand side explanatory variables in equation (20) we note that the ￿rst term
capturing ￿xed trade costs, 4FCod, is calculated on the basis of ￿rms pro￿ts, 4￿od.
According to the ￿rm-level tax data, the pro￿ts of exporting ￿rms vary considerably
over time without a clear trend in the Balkans. The index of trade freeness, ￿od,
which we use as a proxy for trade costs is also time-variant (see Figure 1 in section
4.3); according to our estimates, the SEE trade freeness has almost doubled since the
end of the Balkan wars. Given that the multilateral trade resistance, ￿d, is calculated
on the basis of two time-variant variables, it is time-variant too.23 We may conclude
that the inclusion of ￿xed e⁄ects is not an issue for our model, because all right-hand
side explanatory variables in equation (20) are time-variant.
In order the ￿xed e⁄ects estimator to be unbiased, we need to assume that ex-
planatory variables, 4FCodt￿1 and 4￿dot￿1, are strictly exogenous conditional on
time invariant constant, ￿od. In order to test for endogeneity we add next year￿ s
explanatory variables (in logarithmic form) and run a robust t-test. In doing so we
lose the last year of the data. Both coe¢ cients are very small, -0.059 and -0.0471 and
the t-statistic is only -0.018. From the robust t-test results, we may conclude there
is no evidence against the strict exogeneity assumption.
In order to ensure that the ￿xed e⁄ects estimator is well behaved asymptotically,
we need a standard rank condition on the matrix of time-demeaned explanatory
variables. In order to ensure that the ￿xed e⁄ects estimator is e¢ cient, we need to
assume that the conditional variances are constant and the conditional covariances
are zero. While the heteroscedasticity in time-demeaned errors, ￿ ￿odt, might be a
potential problem, serial correlation is likely to be less important. Because of the
time demeaning, the serial correlation in the time-demeaned errors, ￿ ￿odt, under the
latter assumption causes only minor complications.
Finally, in order to ensure that the obtained parameters are consistent with the
theoretical trade model, we need to impose parameter restrictions implied by the
theoretical trade model. Equation (20) contains two key parameters of the underlying
theoretical trade model (￿2 = 1 ￿
￿
￿￿1 and ￿3 = ￿). In particular, the theoretical
trade model requires that ￿ > 1 and ￿ > ￿ ￿ 1.
22In panel data analysis the term ￿ time-varying explanatory variables￿means that each explanatory
variable varies over time for some cross section units. There might be explanatory variables that
are constant across time for a subset of the cross section, but this is irrelevant.
23This might result in non-stationary multilateral resistance, 4￿do, which we discuss below.
224.3 Estimation results: trade costs
We begin by presenting the estimation results for trade costs between the SEE Balkan
economies. Before presenting the estimation results, we brie￿ y discuss data, which
we use for estimating the trade freeness.
Our sample consists of eight SEE economies - Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia & Montenegro.24 The time
period covered spans 1999 to 2004. Given that no reliable international bilateral
trade statistics exist for such geographic coverage and time period, we had to draw
on national trade statistics data on bilateral export ￿ ows.25 Although cumbersome,
mapping of trade data provided by national statistical o¢ ces is the only way to
obtain complete statistical information for the SEE bilateral trade. Given that the
SEE economies use their own national currencies, the obtained export values need to
be converted in one currency. We calculate all ￿ ows in Euros, as since 2003 the SEE
national statistical resources report all international statistics not only in national
currencies, but also in Euros.
As a result, we obtain eight equally sized panels each containing 48 observations
(8 countries ￿ 6 years). Using this data we estimate the index of trade freeness,
￿od, according to equation (17) for each SEE country. The obtained trade freeness
estimates are reported in Figure 1, where the trade freeness estimates, ￿od, are on
the vertical axis and time span is on the horizontal axis.
Given that the measure of trade freeness, ￿od, is negatively related to trade costs
with 0 denoting prohibitive trade costs and 1 free trade, estimates in Figure 1 suggest
that the overall level of trade freeness is very low in the SEE economies. Although,
these countries are known for their high levels of the formal trade integration since
the end of the Balkan wars in 1999 (there exist a network of 31 bilateral FTAs), the
estimated trade freeness is lower than 0.1 (SEE average). This indicates that less
that 10% of the total trade in the SEE crosses national borders.
These estimates are very low compared to the Head and Mayer (2004) trade
freeness estimates of the EU internal trade. Depending on the period covered and
countries included, Head and Mayer estimates range from 0.315 to 0.478. As a
robustness test of our estimates we also estimate trade freeness for the SEE trade
with the EU. The obtained trade freeness estimates for the SEE trade with the EU
range from 0.125 to 0.176 in 2004 and are between our estimates for intr-SEE trade
and Head and Mayer estimates for intra-EU trade. These results suggest that our
results are consistent with Head and Mayer (2004) estimates of trade freeness.
The second attribute, which can be taken from Figure 1, is that the SEE trade
freeness has increased between 1999 and 2004. On average, trade freeness has in-
creased by almost one third from 0.066 to 0.084. Moreover, the estimates reported in
24Despite the recently re-established independence of Montenegro, Serbia and Montenegro is con-
sidered as one country in the empirical analysis.
25For example, Eurostat￿ s Comext trade data does not cover bilateral trade ￿ ows among third
countries. It only contains SEE trade with the EU.
23Figure 1 suggest that the trade freeness has increased at di⁄erent growth rates within
SEE. The most sizeable increase in the regional trade freeness we have estimated
for Albania (+86.4%), Romania (+85.3%) and Moldova (+85.0%). According to the
same estimates, the bilateral trade freeness has increased least rapidly in Serbia &
Montenegro. Trade costs might have decreased slower in Serbia & Montenegro be-
cause of two reasons: relatively large internal market and continuing armed con￿ icts,






























Figure 1: Trade freeness of the SEE bilateral trade, 1999-2004
The obtained trade freeness estimates can be used for both to estimate the gravity
model of trade ￿ ows and to empirically implement the theoretical trade model for
policy simulations. These estimates also allow us to draw several conclusions, which
are relevant for both applications: (i) compared to the EU internal trade, trade
freeness is still very low in the SEE countries; (ii) trade freeness is increasing rapidly
(SEE average +77.5% in the period 1999 to 2004) and increasing with an increasing
rate, which implies that the inclusion of the trade freeness estimates among the
explanatory variables in the gravity model of trade might lead to non-stationarity
problems; and (iii) because of (i) and (ii), the proposed BFTA has large potential in
increasing trade openness and facilitating regional trade in the Balkans.
4.4 Estimation results: trade ￿ ows
In this section we estimate the gravity equation of trade (20) using panel data for eight
SEE countries - Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia,
Moldova, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro. As above, the time series in our data goes
from 1999 to 2004. Given that we only consider bilateral trade ￿ ows among the SEE
24countries, the cross-section dimension of our data is equal to eight. Similarly to the
trade freeness estimations reported in the previous section, our data allows to build
eight equally sized panels with 48 observations in each panel. Lagging explanatory
variables by one year reduces the number of observations per panel to 40 (8 countries
￿ 5 years).
Estimation of equation (20) requires time series cross section data of bilateral
trade ￿ ows, Eod, ￿rm pro￿t data and multilateral resistance variable, ￿d. Calculation
of the multilateral resistance requires data for trade freeness, ￿od, supply of labour
force in each country, Lr, and the total labour force, L. Data sources for export ￿ ows
have already been detailed in the previous section. Firm pro￿t data are drawn from
national tax registers, which are available on yearly basis for all SEE countries in
our sample. Numerical values for importer and exporter multilateral resistance, ￿r,
are calculated by drawing the supply of labour force in each country, Lr, and the
total labour force, L, from the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies
(WIIW) (2005 and 2006) Handbook of Statistics and the above presented estimates
of trade freeness, ^ ￿od.
Regression results for the ￿xed e⁄ects model are presented in Table 1. Accord-
ing to Table 1, bilateral export ￿ ows are negatively a⁄ected by ￿xed trade costs -
coe¢ cient ￿2 estimates are negative for all countries. The magnitude of these esti-
mates are around one (except Serbia and Montenegro -2.118) and are of the same
order across the SEE countries in our sample. The largest coe¢ cient have been es-
timated for Serbia and Montenegro and the smallest for Albania (-0.726) which is
in line with previous studies (Messerlin and Miroudot 2004, Bussiere, Fidrmuc and
Schnatz 2004). The estimates of coe¢ cient ￿2 are statistically signi￿cant for three
SEE countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia.
Are these results in line with our expectations and previous trade studies on
Balkans? Given that the relationship between explanatory and dependent variables in
equation (20) is non-linear, and coe¢ cient ￿2 is non-linear in structural parameters, is
not straightforward to answer the consistency question. According to the underlying
theoretical model, exports are decreasing in ￿xed trade costs, FCod. This implies
that the ratio of export ￿ ows, 4Eodt, is also decreasing in the ratio of ￿xed costs,
4FCod. I.e., the lower are ￿xed export costs from origin country o to destination
country d in terms of ￿xed costs from d to o, the higher are exports from o to d and
vice versa. Thus, for those countries, where coe¢ cient ￿2 estimates are negative, the
total impact of the ￿rst right-hand side term on exports ￿ ows is consistent with the
underlying theory. This is true for all countries in our sample. We conclude that our
estimates are in line with the underlying theoretical trade model.
The other explanatory variable, which has been regressed on export ￿ ows, is the
multilateral resistance, ￿r. According to Table 1, bilateral export ￿ ows are positively
a⁄ected by the multilateral resistance - coe¢ cient ￿3 estimates are positive for all
countries in our sample. Given that all estimated ￿3 coe¢ cients are larger than one,
the multilateral trade resistance raises trade at an increasing rate. The cross-section
25variation of coe¢ cient ￿3 estimates is higher compared to ￿2. Signs of the estimated
impact of the multilateral resistance are in line with the underlying theoretical trade
model and with previous gravity studies (e.g. Anderson and Wincoop 2003).
Table 1: Fixed e⁄ects estimates of bilateral exports
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￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿2 -0:726yy -1:264y -0:749 -1:392 -0:758y -1:065 -1:212 -2:118
(0:223) (0:563) (0:428) (0:741) (0:320) (0:754) (1:179) (3:026)
￿3 4:009yy 7:602 3:391y 3:849y 6:445 3:015yy 3:346y 4:174y
(1:210) (5:483) (1:496) (1:606) (3:558) (0:853) (1:354) (1:915)
N 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
R2 0:533 0:491 0:667 0:534 0:608 0:525 0:528 0:479
Dependent variable: log of bilateral exports, lnEod, (equation 20). Standard
errors in parenthesis. y signi￿cant at 95% level, yy signi￿cant at 99% level.
As usual, we test the robustness with respect to the choice of estimator and the
underlying assumptions. First, we estimate equation (20) using contemporaneous
values of explanatory variables. On average, this reduces the numerical values of
coe¢ cients by one third, but does not change signs of the estimated coe¢ cients.
Testing the idiosyncratic errors for serial correlation is more tricky, as we cannot
estimate the ￿odt. Because of the time demeaning used in ￿xed e⁄ects, we can only
estimate the time-demeaned errors, ￿ ￿odt. Given the relatively short time dimension
of our panel, we neglect this issue in the empirical analysis.
From the estimated coe¢ cients we can calculate parameter values for the theoret-
ical trade model. More precisely, from ￿2 estimates we obtain values for the elasticity
of substitution, ￿r, where ￿r =
￿
1￿￿2 + 1, with ￿ 6= 0 ^ 1
￿ (￿￿2 + 1) 6= 0. Numerical
values of the ￿rm heterogeneity parameter, ￿r, are obtained from the coe¢ cient ￿3
estimates, where ￿r = ￿3. The bilateral trade cost values are obtained from the trade







5 BFTA impact on trade in the Balkans
In the previous two sections we have presented the theoretical trade model and esti-
mated parameters which are required for empirical implementation of the theoretical
trade model. In this section we substitute the estimated parameters into the theoret-
ical trade model and drawing on statistical data for the base year we apply the model
for assessing impacts of the proposed trade integration in the Balkans. More precisely,
we perform simulation experiments of the proposed Balkan Free Trade Agreement by
26simulating three hypothetical policy scenarios. Beyond quantifying the aggregate
impact on trade ￿ ows, our trade model also allows for decomposing the aggregate
trade growth into two separate components - the intensive margin of trade and the
extensive margin of trade growth.
5.1 Empirical implementation
Empirical implementation of the general equilibrium trade model requires two types
of data: model parameters and numerical values of exogenous variables. Parameter
values have already been estimated in the previous section. The only two parameters
left, which could neither be estimated nor could be drawn from statistical data are
the two types of trade costs. In particular, the theoretical trade model requires
separate values for variable trade cost, ￿od, and ￿xed trade cost, FCod. Numerical
values of these two parameters are obtained by combining the survey-based shares
for di⁄erentiated trade costs in the SEE countries with the estimated values of trade
freeness, ￿od.
Numerical values of exogenous variables have to be drawn from statistical data.
For the present study we require numerical values for regional employment, Lr, and
total employment, L. This data is available for all SEE economies in both primary and
secondary statistics. Given that the WIIW￿ s (2005) data does not reveal signi￿cant
deviations from the national statistics data in 2004, we draw regional employment
data and total labour force endowment in SEE from the WIIW￿ s (2005 and 2006)
Handbook of Statistics. The base year, to which we ￿t the theoretical trade model, is
2004. This is the most recent year for which the required statistical data is available
for all eight SEE economies.
Using the base year data for regional employment, Lr, total employment, L, bilat-
eral trade costs (variable trade costs, ￿od, and ￿xed trade costs, FCod), multilateral
trade resistance, ￿d, and the estimated model parameters, we are able to empirically
implement and solve the model for the general trade equilibrium. In the context of
the present study we are particularly interested in export ￿ ows, Eod, and its compo-
nents Nod and eod, which are calculated according to equations (12), (14) and (16).
Given that these equations do not contain any endogenous variables, we can straight-
forwardly plug equation (13) into equations (12), (14) and (16) and solve the model
for the general trade equilibrium.
By implementing the theoretical trade model empirically and solving for the long-
run trade equilibrium, we obtain a set of endogenous variables, which we call the
base run equilibrium. In order to assess robustness of these results, we compare
the obtained base run values of endogenous variables with those observed in the
base year data. Comparing the obtained results with statistical data suggests that
our model has not been able to exactly replicate the statistically observed trade in
2004.26 However, the simulated trade ￿ ows are of the same order of magnitude as the
26Given that there are many other aspects that determine trade ￿ ows in the Balkans (e.g., histor-
27corresponding values recorded in the SEE statistical data.27
5.2 Impact of declining trade barriers
In order to study the impacts of the proposed BFTA, in this section we perform ex
ante simulations of alternative trade policy scenarios. Given that the exact mag-
nitude of the e⁄ective reduction of trade barriers is not known a priori, we set up
hypothetical trade policy liberalisation scenarios, in which the potential impacts of
the proposed trade integration in the Balkans can be studied. In order to facilitate
the identi￿cation of changes in the two di⁄erent trade margins (the intensive margin
and the extensive margin of trade), three alternative trade policy liberalisation sce-
narios are constructed. First, we reduce both the variable and the ￿xed trade costs
in 10% steps up to 30%, which corresponds to 70% of the initial trade cost values.
Second, we simulate ￿xed trade cost reduction in the same order of magnitude. In a
third scenario we reduce the per unit (variable) trade costs in 10% steps up to 30%.
The obtained simulation results are reported in Tables 2-4.
We start with presenting the aggregate impacts on export ￿ ows. Simulation results
reported in Table 2 suggest that a 10% reduction in both variable and ￿xed trade
costs have a positive and large impact on trade ￿ ows. In terms of the total export
value (row Eod in Table 2) our model predicts sizable trade gains. These results are in
line with previous studies of trade liberalisation in South Eastern Europe (Stubos and
Tsikripis 2007). According to our simulations, if both ￿xed and variable trade costs
were reduced by the same percentage, then the largest gainers from trade integration
were Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Romania. The estimated trade gains are
di⁄erent across the SEE countries ranging from +149.8% in Moldova to +208.2% in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The aggregate impact of declining trade barriers on the export value is not only
sizable, it is also larger than the impact of the same trade barriers estimated in trade
models with representative ￿rms (Messerlin and Miroudot 2004, Bussiere, Fidrmuc
and Schnatz 2004). In our study the impact of trade integration is larger because, in
addition to adjustments in the intensive margin of trade, which is well captured in
trade models with representative ￿rms, our model also captures adjustments in the
extensive margin of trade. According to simulation results reported in Table 2, when
both ￿xed and variable trade costs are reduced by the same percentage, adjustments
in the extensive margin of trade are even more signi￿cant than adjustments in the
intensive margin of trade in the SEE economies. In trade models with representative
￿rms, when trade barriers decline, each ￿rm exports more. In our model, however,
in addition to larger average shipments per each existing ￿rm, new ￿rms would enter
foreign markets and start exporting. Our simulation results suggest that the entry
ical ties, cultural preferences), which are not captured in our model, our predictions deviate from
the base year statistical data.
27For the base year (2004) the correlation is rather high (R2 = 0:871).
28Table 2: Variable and ￿xed trade cost impact on export ￿ ows
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￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
E
y
od 168.8 208.2 199.4 207.4 195.4 149.8 206.6 185.5
eod 33.2 51.1 35.2 39.1 47.2 28.0 41.4 29.3
Nod 101.8 104.0 121.5 121.1 100.7 95.2 116.8 120.8
yEod-% change in total trade ￿ ows, eod-% change in the intensive
margin of trade, Nod-% change in the extensive margin of trade.
margin of exporting is both statistically and economically signi￿cant (compare row
Nod to row eod in Table 2).
According to previous studies, the aggregate trade growth might be more or less
valuable for trading partners because the induced welfare impacts depend on how
exactly does the trade growth occur - along the intensive or the extensive margin of
trade (Hillberry and Hummels 2005, Hummels and Klenow 2005). While the ability
to account for both these aspects is one of the main strengths of our approach, data
limitations do not allow us to perform more detailed welfare analysis along sectoral,
regional and socio-economic trade components, which is a promising avenue for future
research.
Our results suggest that if trade growth along the extensive margin is more valu-
able than trade growth along the intensive margin, then the largest gainers from the
trade integration in the Balkans were Serbia and Montenegro. In these countries the
export volume grows more than four times faster along the extensive margin than the
intensive margin of trade. The export growth along the extensive margin is about
twice as high as export growth along the intensive margin in Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina and Macedonia. Considering both these aspects, the aggregate trade growth and
growth share of extensive margin, the largest gainers might turn out to be countries,
which do not head any of the two categories.
5.3 Impact of variable trade barriers
In the previous section we have assessed the impact of changes in aggregate trade
costs, i.e. both ￿xed and variable trade costs were reduced simultaneously by the
same percentage. This type of analysis is done in most empirical ex-ante trade policy
studies of SEE. Compared to previous trade studies our model has the advantage
that, in addition to assessing the aggregate impact of trade policy integration, it
allows us to investigate how separate parts of total trade costs (￿xed and variable
29trade costs) a⁄ect export growth. In this section the aggregate impact of declining
trade barriers is decomposed into two separate parts: changes in export value due
to declining variable trade costs and changes in export value due to declining ￿xed
trade costs. We are interested in decomposing the aggregate impact of trade costs,
because if these impacts turn out to be signi￿cant and asymmetric, then trade policy
implications will be di⁄erent too.
In this section we perform scenario simulations of reducing the per unit trade costs
in 10% steps up to 30%. The obtained results are reported in Table 3. As above,
the other two rows in Table 3 (eod and Nod) separate out impacts of the two trade
margins. The intensive margin (row eod in Table 3) reports how much each existing
exporter changes the size of its exports. The extensive margin (row Nod in Table 3)
reports how much new entrants export (in the case of a reduction in trade barriers).
Table 3: Variable trade cost impact on export ￿ ows in the SEE
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￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
E
y
od 122.5 166.6 143.7 153.7 154.5 104.4 156.0 126.8
eod 33.2 51.1 35.2 39.1 47.2 28.0 41.4 29.3
Nod 67.1 76.5 80.3 82.4 72.9 59.8 81.0 75.4
yEod-% change in total trade ￿ ows, eod-% change in the intensive
margin of trade, Nod-% change in the extensive margin of trade.
According to simulation results reported in Table 3, the impact of variable trade
costs reduction on aggregate export value in SEE is always positive, but smaller
than the impact of reducing both variable and ￿xed trade costs. Decomposing the
aggregate impact on exports suggests that in addition to adjusting the average export
size of existing exporting ￿rms, the set of exporters adjusts in the SEE economies too,
which ampli￿es the aggregate impact of changes in variable trade costs. According to
simulation results reported in Table 3, declining variable trade costs induce not only
an increase in the average size of exporters (row eod in Table 3), but also attract new
￿rms to enter foreign markets and start exporting (row Nod in Table 3).
The simulated trade gains are di⁄erent across the SEE countries ranging from
+104.4% in Moldova to +166.6 in Bosnia and Herzegovina (row Eod in Table 3)
suggesting that in some SEE countries (e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina) the respon-
siveness of exports with respect to variable trade barriers is considerably higher than
in other Balkan economies (e.g. Moldova). The cross-country trade cost di⁄erences
alone would not lead to such sizeable di⁄erences in trade gains (i.e. export growth).
According to the underlying theoretical model, the export responsiveness with re-
30spect to variable trade barriers depends on the elasticity of substitution, as well as
on the degree of ￿rm heterogeneity, ￿.28 In more homogeneous sectors (high ￿) large
productive ￿rms represent a smaller fraction in the total set of ￿rms (see equation
16) implying that the productivity threshold of exporting moves to a region, where
the main mass of ￿rms lies. As a result, in those countries with more homogenous
manufacturing sectors, exports are rather sensitive to changes in variable trade costs
because many ￿rms enter, when variable trade costs decline. These results are in line
with previous studies on industry concentration in the SEE, which suggest that man-
ufacturing industries are less concentrated in the EU accession countries (Bulgaria,
Croatia and Romania) than in other SEE economies (Astrov 2001).
5.4 Impact of ￿xed trade costs
According to Hunting Technical Services (HTSPE 2005), non-tari⁄ trade barriers
are extremely high in SEE. The proposed BFTA should signi￿cantly contribute to
reducing non-tari⁄barriers of bilateral SEE trade. Given that in empirical trade cost
literature (e.g. Anderson and Wincoop 2003) non-tari⁄ trade barriers are usually
associated with ￿xed trade costs, in this section we investigate how export ￿ ows in
the SEE economies would be a⁄ected if the BFTA would mainly reduce ￿xed trade
costs. As in the previous two sections, ￿xed trade costs are reduced in 10% steps up
to 30%, which corresponds to 70% of the initial trade cost. The obtained simulation
results are reported in Table 4.
Table 4: Fixed trade cost impact on export ￿ ows in the SEE
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￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
E
y
od 20.8 15.6 22.9 21.2 16.1 22.2 19.8 25.9
eod 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Nod 20.8 15.6 22.9 21.2 16.1 22.2 19.8 25.9
yEod-% change in total trade ￿ ows, eod-% change in the intensive
margin of trade, Nod-% change in the extensive margin of trade.
28In trade models with representative ￿rms the amount exported to a given country depends
on how competitive a ￿rm is against other foreign exporters. Di⁄erences in competitiveness due
to trade costs have a greater or lesser impact on trade ￿ ows depending on whether the exported
goods are more or less substitutable. If the exported goods are more substitutable (￿k is high), the
intensive margin of trade is strongly a⁄ected by even tiny changes in trade barriers, implying that
the elasticity of substitution, ￿k, is the only parameter determining the adjustment speed in trade
models with representative ￿rms.
31The simulation results reported in Table 4 suggest that ￿xed trade cost reduction
has a positive, but a rather moderate impact on export ￿ ows. On average, reducing
￿xed trade costs by 10 % increases the aggregate export value by only 19%. Only in
Serbia and Montenegro the induced trade growth is more sizable (+25.9%).
Why do changes in ￿xed trade costs have a considerably smaller impact on export
￿ ows compared to changes in variable trade costs? The answer can be found by
considering the underlying theoretical trade model. According to equation (16), the
intensive trade margin does not respond to changes in ￿xed trade costs (row eod in
Table 4). When ￿xed trade costs change, all adjustments work solely through the
extensive margin (row Nod in Table 4).
Although, according to HTSPE (2005), non-tari⁄ trade barriers are extremely
high in SEE, the resulting trade gains from reducing these barriers (i.e. ￿xed costs)
seem to be rather limited. These results suggest that either the payo⁄ of reducing
non-tari⁄barriers in the SEE trade would be rather limited or that we cannot straight-
forwardly associate ￿xed trade costs with non-tari⁄trade barriers, as is usually done
in empirical trade literature. In order to obtain more insights about the impact of
￿xed trade costs on trade ￿ ows, these results urge for more empirical research on
￿xed trade costs.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we study how trade integration would a⁄ect the structure of export
growth in the SEE economies. By decomposing aggregate trade ￿ ows into extensive
and intensive margins of trade, we found that in contrast to previous SEE studies
(Messerlin and Miroudot 2004, Bussiere, Fidrmuc and Schnatz 2004), trade policy
liberalisation in the Balkans would primarily increase bilateral trade ￿ ows through a
larger number of exported goods and varieties, but not by increasing the average value
per shipment. These results complement the results of previous studies reporting that
the extensive margin of trade is more signi￿cant for trade growth than the intensive
margin (Kehoe and Ruhl 2002, Hillberry and McDaniel 2002, Eaton et al 2004,
Hummels and Klenow 2005).
Our empirical ￿ndings are summarised in Table 5, which report average export
growth rates for the SEE economies, when variable trade cost, ￿od, and ￿xed trade
cost, FCod, would decline. The results reported in Table 5 allows us to draw clear-
cut policy conclusions. First, if the main policy objective is to increase the aggregate
value of exports, then the most e⁄ective trade liberalisation policy in the Balkans
would be to reduce variable trade costs, ￿od, by extending the proposed BFTA to
areas such as improving rail and road infrastructure, with the goal to reduce per-unit
shipping costs. Second, reducing solely ￿xed trade costs, such as non-tari⁄ trade
barriers and border-crossing bureaucracy, would induce only limited export growth.
Therefore, ￿xed trade cost reduction is the second best policy option, if the main
policy objective is to increase the aggregate value of exports. Third, if the main
32policy objective is to maintain and extend market share of a few large internationally
competitive enterprises, then, depending on the relative reduction costs (governments
may face di⁄erent budget costs of reducing 10% variable vs. 10% ￿xed trade costs),
the most e⁄ective trade policy might be reducing ￿xed trade costs, FCod.
We also found that reducing variable trade costs has a quantitatively larger impact
on export growth than reducing ￿xed trade costs by the same percentage. The largest
gainers from reducing variable trade costs were Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Macedonia and Romania. However, if the proposed BFTA would mainly
reduce ￿xed costs of trade, such as non-tari⁄ trade barriers, the largest gainers were
Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro. These re-
sults suggest that Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania would be among the largest winners
of free trade area in the Balkans under either scenario.
Table 5: Average impact of ￿xed and variable trade cost reduction on export growth
in the SEE
Trade cost decline (-10%)
variable, ￿od ￿xed, FCod
Export growth (%)
Intensive margin, eod +38.0 ￿0.00
Extensive margin, Nod +74.4 +20.5
Trade costs ￿exogenous, export growth ￿endogenous.
Source: own calculations based on Tables 2￿4.
Turning to potential de￿ciencies of our approach, we identify two issues which
could be further developed in future research. First, the assumptions of identical
technologies across countries and proxying country size by the employed labour force
need to be reconsidered. Indeed, relaxing these two assumptions in a heterogenous
￿rm framework would be a promising area for future research and, in the context
of our study, potentially lead to di⁄erent welfare implications of trade liberalisation.
In fact, some progress has already been made in this area since this study was com-
pleted. For example, Bernard et al (2007) assume that in addition to heterogeneous
productivity of ￿rms and country di⁄erences in factor endowment, countries also dif-
fer in terms of relative factor abundance and industries vary in terms of relative factor
intensity. Findings of Bernard et al suggest that falling trade costs induce realloca-
tion of resources both within and across industries and countries, which magni￿es the
comparative advantage and creates additional welfare gains from trade. Given that
these additional welfare gains of resource reallocation found by Bernard et al (2007)
may be unevenly distributed between the intensive and extensive margins of trade,
the Bernard et al framework might potentially lead to di⁄erent welfare and policy
conclusions.
33The second issue which need to be addressed in future research is the consistency
of econometric speci￿cation with the theoretical model. Although, the reduced form
model, which we estimated in section 4, is largely derived from the theoretical trade
model (section 3) and most of the estimated parameter values are signi￿cant and
robust, the consistency of the two speci￿cations might still be a critical issue. The
consistency problem of the two speci￿cations could be circumvented, for example, if
either the reduced form gravity model would be used for the ex-ante trade policy
impact analysis; or if model parameters would be estimated (calibrated) within the
general equilibrium trade model. Although, both techniques are widely used in ex-
ante trade policy impact assessment studies, they su⁄er from other limitations, which
we discussed in above.
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